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Abstract
Unlike traditional networks which are statically configured, SDN
control applications are dynamic and are becoming more heteroge-
neous and complex. There is a great need for a framework to reason
about the behavior of the various SDN applications. To the best of our
knowledge, current network modeling frameworks were not designed to
incorporate the application logic into their models, and thus can not
be used to accurately model the application. In this paper, we suggest
the possibility of leveraging the impact which control applications as-
sert on the network information base to reason about the behavior of
such applications. Based on that, we propose SDN-VSA, a framework
that models SDN control applications as a set of affine transformations
in some vector space. Finally, we present an analytical formulation for
such framework, and discuss a use-case. For simplicity, we only con-
sider the case of OpenFlow version 1.0.
Index terms— SDN; Modeling; Framework; Analysis; Control Applica-
tions
1 Introduction
In Software-Defined Networking (SDN), the control of the whole network
is now transferred to the SDN controller which enables a set of network
applications to function. It is of a great prominence to be able to analyze
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these applications for problems prior the actual deployment. Such problems
if not fixed might take the whole network down.
A multitude of network analysis frameworks [8, 6, 4, 1, 11] have been
devised for analyzing traditional networks, and some of those solutions could
possibly be imported into SDN. Network checking tools could be devised
on top of such frameworks (e.g., NetPlumber [7]), these tools can read the
configurations of network devices then check these configurations for possible
networking issues.
We believe that network analysis frameworks can be useful in SDN for
the following reasons: (1) SDN applications can be complex, so there is a
need to reason about how would they function prior the actual deployment,
(2) controllers, in many cases, allow more than one SDN application to
run simultaneously. Hence, there is a need to be able to check if those
applications would create any conflict, and (3) a what-if analysis for any
new rules could be conducted by controllers.
We present SDN Vector Space Analysis (SDN-VSA), a framework for
modeling SDN control applications. SDN-VSA is based on the idea of lever-
aging the impact which control applications assert on the network informa-
tion base to reason about the behavior of such applications. The framework
models the switching functionalities as affine transformations [13]. While
the idea of representing data-planes as transformations is not novel and was
proposed in earlier work [8], our framework specifically targets SDN. To
realize such framework, we propose to model the control application as a
composite transformation matrix operating on a network information base
matrix.
In this paper, we make the following contributions: (1) we propose an
analytical framework (SDN-VSA) using vector spaces and affine transforma-
tions for modeling SDN control application, (2) we present a formulation for
such framework which can be used to analyze and reason about SDN control
applications, and (3) we discuss a use-case for the proposed framework.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In §2, we provide back-
ground on the topic and related work. We discuss the need for an SDN
framework in §3. The proposed framework is presented in §4. Then, we
present our formulation for such framework in §5. The use-case is shown in
§6 Finally §7 will be our conclusion and an outline for possible foreseeable
work.
2 Related Work
In this section, we survey a number of relevant frameworks which were de-
vised for network analysis. Table 1 includes a summary of these frameworks.
Karsten et al. [6] studied the complexity of the Internet. They found
that the current Internet architecture occasionally violates the layered archi-
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tecture. Thus, it is no longer appropriate to model the network as a graph.
So they created an axiomatic framework intended to reason about the for-
warding mechanisms in networks and to serve as a basis for verification
and formal proofs of correctness of protocols and their implementations.
Their formalization is based on high-level Hoare-style assertions (Hoare-
logic), rather than low-level operational semantics. Further, they presented
some use-cases for their framework including: TCP-over-NAT, DNS and Hi-
erarchical Mobile IP. However, their work only considers connectivity, and
is oblivious to time and cannot model losses and timeouts.
Kazemian et al. [8] investigated the complexity of current networks.
They found that even when individual protocols function correctly, failures
can arise from the complex interactions of their aggregate, requiring net-
work administrators to be masters of detail. Thus, they came up with a
protocol-agnostic framework called “Header Space Analysis” (HSA) based
on geometric model for packet classification, with the objective of auto-
matically finding an important class of failures, regardless of the protocols
running. They also modeled the network boxes (e.g., switches and routers)
as transfer functions that operates on the packet headers. Their formalism
allows statically checking network configurations to identify an important
class of failures as Reachability Failures, Forwarding Loops and Traffic Iso-
lation and Leakage problems. Moreover, they developed Hassel a tool that
realizes HSA and was used to analyze Stanford University’s backbone net-
work. However, their model can only do static analysis of networks to detect
forwarding and configuration errors, but in later work [7] they solved that
issue by developing NetPlumber.
Kazemian et al. [7] developed NetPlumber after they realized that the
network state may change rapidly, and the network must ensure correctness.
Policy checkers cannot verify in real-time because of the need to collect state
and time information. They also realized that SDN provides an opportu-
nity as it maintains a logically centralized view of the network at the con-
troller. However, the issue of creating a fast compliance checker remains.
NetPlumber is based on HSA but unlike HSA, it incrementally checks for
compliance of state changes, by maintaining a dependency graph between
rules (i.e. a graph of flow tables). The tool was used to detect Loops, Black-
Holes and Reachability problems. They evaluated NetPlumber in (1) Google
WAN, (2) Stanford Backbone, and (3) Internet2. Finally, NetPlumber (like
HSA) relies on reading the state of network devices and therefore cannot
model middleboxes with dynamic state, and it requires greater processing
time for verifying link updates.
Dhawan et al. [4] were concerned with the security and correct function-
ing of the entire SDN. They presented SPHINX to detect both known and
potentially unknown attacks on network topology and data plane forward-
ing originating within an SDN. SPHINX leverages the novel abstraction of
flow graphs for real-time detection of security threats, enable incremental
3
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validation of network updates. SPHINX analyzes specific OpenFlow control
messages to learn new network behavior and metadata for both topologi-
cal and forwarding state. They studied attacks on the network topology
such as: ARP poisoning, and fake topology, as well as attacks on data-plane
forwarding such as: Controller DoS, Network DoS, TCAM exhaustion, and
switching blackholes.
Anderson et al. [1] were concerned with the lack of a semantic founda-
tion to reason precisely about networking code. They studied the network
programming languages and found that the design of high-level languages
for programming networks is ad-hoc, driven by the needs of applications and
the capabilities of network hardware than by foundational principles. Thus,
they presented NetKAT a new network programming language based on
Kleene algebra a solid mathematical foundation and comes equipped with a
complete equational theory. NetKAT models the network as an automaton
that moves packets from one node to another along the links in its topology
and hence makes use of regular expressions and the language of finite au-
tomata. As for the use-cases, they were concerned with reachability, traffic
isolation, access control, and compiler correctness.
Network operators need tools to determine the impact of changes that
they make, because bad updates can bring down the entire network. Nelson
et al. [11] developed Chimp a tool for static differential analysis of SDN
controller programs without the need of formal methods. Chimp can be
used to present the semantic or the behavioral difference between any two
versions of a program. The tool was demonstrated with a NATing code
written in Flowlog. Further, it was tested with a L2 learning switch, round-
robin LB, and ARP cache applications. Chimp relies on Flowlog [12] a
declarative language used for writing SDN applications that was developed
by the same authors in a previous work. In Flowlog, every rule is equivalent
to a first-order logic formula.
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Table 1: A comparison of some network analysis frameworks
Axiomatic Basis for
Communication
Header Space
Analysis
Real Time Network
Policy Checking SPHINX NetKAT
Static Diff. Program
Analysis for SDN
Problem
Internet is complex.
Layering violation.
Networks are com-
plex.
Failures can arise
from complex inter-
actions of individual
protocols that func-
tion correctly.
Networks must en-
sure correctness while
their state may change
rapidly.
Policy checkers can-
not verify in real-time
because they need to
collect state and need
time to analyze it.
SDNs provide a logi-
cally centralized view
but remains the need
for a fast compliance
checker.
Security and correct
functioning of the en-
tire SDN.
Design of high-level
network program-
ming languages is
ad-hoc, driven by the
needs of applications
and capabilities of
network hardware
than by foundational
principles.
Lack of a semantic
foundation to reason
about networking
code.
Bad updates can bring
down an entire net-
work.
Objective
Present formulation
of forwarding mecha-
nisms.
Basis for verification
and formal proofs
of correctness of
protocols and their
implementations.
Automatically find an
important class of fail-
ures, regardless of the
protocols running.
Introduces a real-time
policy checking tool
(NetPlumber).
Detect both known
and potentially un-
known attacks on
network topology and
data plane forwarding
originating within an
SDN.
New network pro-
gramming language
Network operators
therefore need tools
to determine the
impact of changes.
Approach
Formalization based
on high-level Hoare-
style assertions
(Hoare-logic), and
can be used to:
(1) formally analyze
network protocols
based on structural
properties,
(2) derive working
prototype imple-
mentations of these
protocols.
Protocol-agnostic
framework: HSA
based on geometric
model for packet
classification.
HSA allows to stat-
ically check network
specs and configs to
identify failures as
Reachability Failures,
Forwarding Loops and
Traffic Isolation and
Leakage problems.
Based on HSA but
incrementally checks
for compliance of
state changes, by
maintaining a depen-
dency graph between
rules (a graph of flow
tables).
Analyzes specific
OpenFlow control
messages to learn
new network behavior
and metadata for
both topological and
forwarding state.
Uses flow graphs for
real-time detection
of security threats,
enable incremental
validation of network
updates.
A new network pro-
gramming language
based on Kleene
algebra a solid math-
ematical foundation
and comes equipped a
complete equational
theory.
Presented Chimp a
tool for static differ-
ential analysis of SDN
controller programs
without the need of
formal methods.
It presents the se-
mantic or behavioral
difference between
two versions of a
program.
Usecase
TCP over NAT
DNS
Hierarchical Mobile
IP
Reachability Analysis
Loop Detection
Slice Isolation
Loops and BlackHoles
Reachability Policies
(1) Attacks on Net-
work Topology: ARP
Poisoning and Fake
topology.
(2) Attacks on Data
Plane Forwarding:
Controller DoS, Net-
work DoS, TCAM
exhaustion and
Switch blackhole.
Reachability
Traffic isolation
Access control
Compiler correctness
NAT code in Flowlog.
Also: L2 Learning
Switch, Round-robin
LB, and ARP cache.
Issues
Only studies connec-
tivity.
Oblivious to time and
cannot model losses
and timeouts.
Only static analysis to
detect forwarding and
configuration errors.
Offers no clues as to
whether routing is ef-
ficient.
Relies on reading
the state of network
devices and therefore
cannot model middle-
boxes with dynamic
state.
Greater processing
time for verifying link
updates.
Focus only on Flowlog
(first-order logic).
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3 The Need for Another Framework
Recent work in network analysis mainly handles the case of static analysis
of networks in order to find important classes of failures. However, network
states are dynamic and can frequently change, making those frameworks
unfeasible for real-time analysis.
Some were not developed to be used during application design as they
require a functioning network to monitor and analyze (e.g., SPHINX [12]).
Those frameworks depend on monitoring the network state, which means
that they can only be used after deployment. Others do not take the appli-
cation logic into their consideration, and hence fail to model dynamic stateful
SDN applications, those that their current state depends on previous states
such as stateful-firewalls and network address translation (NAT).
Moreover, we believe that one way to reason about SDN applications is
through studying the impact they have on the network information base.
Therefore, on contrary to HSA [8] which was designed to be protocol-
agnostic, our model will not consider packets as first class citizens. HSA
models packets as points in header space (H) while ignoring protocol-specific
meanings associated with header bits. However, in SDN OpenFlow-enabled
switches we only need to consider certain fields (listed in Figure 1) in the
packet header such as source IP address, MAC address, and port number,
and destination IP address, MAC address, and port number. The reason is
that OpenFlow [10] only allows matching against or modifying those fields.
As with SPHINX [4], the control logic will be split into OpenFlow [10] primi-
tive control messages. Each control message should be studied carefully and
represented as a transform that would change the current network state.
4 The SDN-VSA Framework
The proposed framework (SDN-VSA) assumes that SDN control applica-
tions are deterministic applications (i.e., they produce the same output for
a certain input). Hence, the framework can leverage the impact (i.e., via
the OpenFlow messages they send to the switches) that applications have
on the network information base to reason about such applications. In this
section, we make some important definitions, and we present the main ax-
ioms of the proposed framework which are required in order to model SDN
control applications.
4.1 Definitions
Definition 1 Control Application: is a set of instructions running at the
control-plane which has the ability to control the switching functionalities of
connected data-planes and collect information from them via messages of a
standard protocol ( e.g., OpenFlow).
6
Carleton University Technical Report SCE-17-02 2017
# Field Length (bits)
f1 Ingress Port -
f2 Ether Source 48
f3 Ether Destination 48
f4 Ether Type 16
f5 VLAN ID 12
f6 VLAN Prio 3
f7 IP Source 32
f8 IP Destination 32
f9 IP Proto 8
f10 IP ToS 6
f11 Transport Source Port 16
f12 Transport Destination Port 16
N - 1 Header Action(s) Counters
N Header Action(s) Counters
Forward
Drop
Modify-Field
Per-Table
Per-Flow
Per-Port
Per-Queue
Figure 1: An OpenFlow-1.0 Table Entry; Header Fields; Actions; and Coun-
ters.
7
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Definition 2 Action: is an instructions associated with a header, installed
by the control application and executed by the data-plane when a flow ar-
rives matching that header. In case of OpenFlow, actions are installed by
FLOW MOD messages.
Definition 3 Network Information Base (NIB): is the aggregate of
topology and/or state information that allows a control application to func-
tion properly.
4.2 Axioms
The following axioms represent a basis for the SDN-VSA framework:
Axiom 1 Any OpenFlow message can be modeled as a linear map in some
vector space.
Let M be the set of all OpenFlow messages, and V is some vector space
over a field F , then:
∀m ∈M, ∃V n ∧ ∃Tm : V n → V n |
Tm(p1 + p2) = Tm(p1) + Tm(p2) . . . p1, p2 ∈ V
∧ Tm(c.p) = c.Tm(p) . . . c ∈ F, p ∈ V
Axiom 2 Any OpenFlow action can be modeled as a linear map in some
vector space (n-dimensional space).
Let A be the set of all OpenFlow actions, and V is some vector space over
a field F , then:
∀a ∈ A, ∃V n ∧ ∃Ta : V n → V n |
Ta(p1 + p2) = Ta(p1) + Ta(p2) . . . p1, p2 ∈ V
∧ Ta(c.p) = c.Ta(p) . . . c ∈ F, p ∈ V
4.3 The Model
From the definitions presented in §4.1 and the Axioms 1 and 2 proposed in
§4.2, we can deduce the following corollaries:
Corollary 1 A control application can be modeled as a composite transfor-
mation matrix that operates on a network information base matrix.

t
′
1
t
′
2
...
t
′
n−1
1
 =

c1,1 c1,2 · · · c1,n
c2,1 c2,2 · · · c2,n
...
...
. . .
...
cn−1,1 cn−1,2 · · · cn−1,n
0 0 · · · 1
×

t1
t2
...
tn−1
1
 (1)
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Corollary 2 (The Congruence Principle) Any two control applications
are congruent in a certain vector space if-and-only-if their composite trans-
formation matrices in that vector space are equal.
5 The Formulation
In this section, we present a formulation for the SDN-VSA framework, other
formulations might also exist. Depending on the control applications, the
NIB might include more network information (i.e., application-specific or
non-OpenFlow) other than just the flow tables. However, in this paper we
only formulate flows tables. More specifically, we define T -space (T ,+,×),
a vector space over a Galois field [9] of two elements (GF(2)) (for simplicity)
where control messages can be represented as linear maps as postulated by
Axiom 1. Then, we formulate R-space as postulated by Axiom 2.
5.1 Assumptions
For simplicity, we make the following assumptions:
• OpenFlow counters can be: (1) per-table, (2) per-flow, (3) per-port,
and (4) per-queue counters. However, in this formulation, we only
consider per-flow counters (we assume a single per-flow counter).
• We assume that a switch can have a single flow-table. Hence, a switch
can be seen equivalent to a flow table.
• We are not considering queues and Quality of Service (QoS) in this
formulation.
• We assume the network topology to be static i.e., no switches can be
removed or added.
5.2 Flow Tables Space (T -space)
Let T be the set of all flow tables. A flow table t ∈ T can be modeled as
a set of tuples (i.e., ordered-pairs) of rules (r) and counters (c) (see Figure
1). Therefore, we define t as:
t = {(r1, c1), . . . , (rn, cn)} . . . ∀t ∈ T ,∀r ∈ R (2)
Let t, t1, t2,Φ ∈ T . Let +,× be two operations (vector addition and
scalar multiplication, respectively) such that ∀t1, t2 ∈ T , t1 + t2 ∈ T and
∀a ∈ GF (2), a× t ∈ T . We define the vector addition using basic set theory
as follows:
t1 + t2 = t1 ∪ t2 . . . ∀t1, t2 ∈ T (3)
t+ Φ = t . . .∀t,Φ ∈ T (4)
9
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We define the scalar multiplication as follows:
0× t = Φ . . . ∀t,Φ ∈ T (5)
1× t = t . . .∀t ∈ T (6)
Moreover, for every flow table t ∈ T with a number (n) of flow rules
(∈ R), we can define another flow table (−t) ∈ T with an equal number (n)
of flow rules, such that every flow rule (r ∈ R) in t has an additive inverse
(−r ∈ R) in (−t).
Since, the following conditions are satisfied [14]:
(t1 + t2) + t3 = t1 + (t2 + t3) . . . ∀t1, t2, t3 ∈ T (7)
t1 + t2 = t2 + t1 . . . ∀t1, t2 ∈ T (8)
∃Φ ∈ T | t+ Φ = t . . .∀t ∈ T (9)
∃ − t ∈ T | t+ (−t) = Φ . . . ∀t ∈ T (10)
a× (b× t) = (a× b)× t . . .∀a, b ∈ GF (2), t ∈ T (11)
∃1 ∈ GF (2) | 1× t = t . . .∀t ∈ T (12)
a× (t1 + t2) = a× t1 + a× t2 . . . ∀a ∈ GF (2), t1, t2 ∈ T (13)
(a+ b)× t = a× t+ b× t . . .∀a, b ∈ GF (2), t ∈ T (14)
Therefore, T -space (T ,+,×) is a vector space over GF (2) a Galois field
of two elements. 
5.3 Flow Rules Space (R-space)
Let R be the set of all flow rules. A flow rule r ∈ R can be modeled as a
vector (tuple) of: (1) a header h ∈ Hn (to match against) where n is the
number of OpenFlow header fields, (2) an output port p−, (3) a time-to-live
τ (we assume one type of TTL), and (4) a set of actions α ∈ A (a composite
transformation matrix).
r =< h, p−, τ, α > . . . ∀r ∈ R (15)
In HSA [8], the H-space is protocol-agnostic. Hence, it views a packet
header as a sequence of ones and zeros in an `-dimensional space ({0, 1}`)
(` is the header length in bits). We model 1 a header h ∈ Hn in a similar
way, but we only consider the case of OpenFlow. In particular, we represent
a header h as a tuple of the n OpenFlow’s fixed-length header fields (see
Figure 1):
h =< f1, f2, ....., fn > . . .∀h ∈ Hn, ∀fi ∈ H (16)
1In this paper, we are not going to prove that the R-space satisfies the conditions of
a vector space, as the vector spaces of the individual components comprising a flow rule
are well-known.
10
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An action α ∈ A is a function in the flow header h ∈ Hn, hence it can
be modeled as follows:
α(h)×

h
p−
τ
1
 (17)
Finally, for every flow rule r ∈ R with a set of actions α ∈ A, we can
define another flow rule (−r) ∈ R with the same flow header h ∈ Hn and
the same output port p−, such that (−r) has a set of actions α−1 ∈ A. Let
I be the identity matrix, then:
α(h)× α−1(h) = I (18)
We call (−r) the additive inverse of r.
∃ − r ∈ R | r + (−r) = φ . . .∀r, φ ∈ R (19)
5.4 Example: FLOW MOD
In OpenFlow, a FLOW MOD message can be used to add, modify, or delete
a flow rule from a flow table. In case of add or modify commands, an action
list needs to be specified. The following actions are supported by OpenFlow:
5.4.1 Forward
An OFPAT OUTPUT action is responsible for outputting any matched flow
to a specific switch port i.e., forwarding. A forward action (αf (h)) can be
modeled as a translation of the output port (p−) by δ as follows:
αf (h) =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 δ
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 (20)
5.4.2 Drop
In OpenFlow, a packet belonging to a matched flow is dropped when the
flow rule has an empty action list. Therefore, a flow dropping action (αd(h))
can be modeled as a zero-scaling transformation as follows:
αd(h) =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
 (21)
11
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5.4.3 Modify-Field
In OpenFlow, certain header fields (∈ Hn) can be modified (see Figure 1) by
a modify-field action. Hence, a modify-field action (αm(h)) can be modeled
as a translation of the flow header h by δ ∈ Hn as follows:
αm(h) =

1 0 0 δ
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 (22)
6 Use-cases
6.1 SDN Service Chaining
With the increasing popularity of SDN as an enabler technology for Network
Function Virtualization (NFV) in the Cloud, network service providers tend
to implement their middle-boxed network services as Virtualized Network
Functions (VNF) [2]. Such services include but are not limited to load-
balancers, firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) [5]. The process
of chaining those services is known as service chaining.
Oftentimes, network service providers - for many reasons - tend to steer
different flows across different sets of middle-boxes (i.e., services) [15]. Re-
cent research is concerned with the issues of steering packets through differ-
ent middle-boxes [3]. Moreover, in some cases, the order at which the flows
steer the network services matters. For example, in the simple case of two
services (show in Figure 2): a load-balancer and an IDS, it is often more
appropriate to steer incoming flows through the IDS first then the load-
balancer in order to reduce the latency (the NIB used in this paper does not
count-in latencies) or prevent any malicious flows from reaching the load-
balanced servers. In such case, we believe that the proposed framework can
be used to reason about flow steering in SDN-enabled network services.
As network services are also control applications, then based on Corollary
1 (see §4.3) of the proposed framework, they can be modeled individually
as composite transformation matrices. Additionally, we can simply deduce
the following Corollary:
Corollary 3 Any chain of services can be modeled as a composite transfor-
mation matrix of its set of services that operates on a network information
base matrix in some vector space.
We can also deduce from Corollary 2 (see §4.3) “The Congruence Princi-
ple” that any two chains of services are congruent in a certain vector space
if-and-only-if their composite transformation matrices in that vector space
are equal.
12
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Moreover, based on the fact that matrix multiplication is non-commutative,
different orders of same services can yield different composite transformation
matrices. However, as translation is isomorphic in T -space (T ,+,×), order
does not matter in any service chain that only contains translations.
For example, assume the following two service chains (shown in Figure
2): (1) IDS→ LB (shown in blue in Figure 2), and (2) LB→ IDS (shown in
red in Figure 2). Let Af be a forwarding action, Ad be a drop action, and
Am,f be a composite action of modify then forward actions. Let N(h) be a
function which given a certain header h, returns the total number of flows
fi having the same source field as h. And let ν be the anomaly detection
threshold.
N(h) =
∑
i=1
[SRC(fi) = SRC(h)] (23)
Let L(s) be a function that given a certain server’s IP address s, returns the
total number of flows fi currently handled by that server.
L(s) =
∑
i=1
[DEST (fi) = s] (24)
In the first case (IDS→ LB), the control transformation matrices (XIDS
and XLB) would be:
XIDS(t, h) =
{
t+ {(< h, pLB, τ, Af >, 0)}, if N(h) ≤ ν
t+ {(< h, pLB, τ, Ad >, 0)}, otherwise
(25)
XLB(t, h) =
{
t+ {(< h, ps1 , τ, Am,f >, 0)}, if L(s1) ≤ L(s2)
t+ {(< h, ps2 , τ, Am,f >, 0)}, otherwise
(26)
XIDS→LB =
1 0 00 1 XIDS
0 0 1
×
1 0 XLB0 1 0
0 0 1
 =
1 0 XLB0 1 XIDS
0 0 1
 (27)
Where pLB is the load-balancer’s port. ps1 , and ps2 are the first and second
server’s ports, respectively.
In the second case (LB → IDS), the control transformation matrices
(YIDS and YLB) would be:
Y ′IDS(t, h) = t+ {(< h, pLB, τ, Af >, 0)} (28)
Y ′LB(t, h) =
{
t+ {(< h, pIDS , τ, Am,f >, 0)}, if L(s1) ≤ L(s2)
t+ {(< h, pIDS , τ, Am,f >, 0)}, otherwise
(29)
13
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Internet
Client1
Clientn
...
Switch1
IDS
Switch2
LB
Server1
Server2
A B
A
B
Figure 2: Two Chains of Network Services.
Y ′′IDS(t, h) =
{
t+ {(< h, pLB, τ, Af >, 0)}, if N(h) ≤ ν
t+ {(< h, pLB, τ, Ad >, 0)}, otherwise
(30)
Y ′′LB(t, h) = t+ {(< h, pDEST (h), τ, Af >, 0)} (31)
Where pIDS is the IDS’s port. pDESTh is the port of server with an IP
address DEST (h).
YLB→IDS =
1 0 00 1 Y ′′LB
0 0 1
×
1 0 Y ′′IDS0 1 0
0 0 1
×
1 0 00 1 Y ′LB
0 0 1
×
1 0 Y ′IDS0 1 0
0 0 1
 =
1 0 Y ′IDS + Y ′′IDS0 1 Y ′LB + Y ′′LB
0 0 1

(32)
From (27) and (32), the composite transformation matrices for the two
service chains are not equal XIDS→LB 6= YLB→IDS . Therefore, the two
service chains: IDS → LB, and LB → IDS are not congruent i.e., they have
different impact on the network information base.
6.2 Discussion on Uses-Cases
In this paper, we only presented the use-case of analyzing flow steering in
network service chains. However, the proposed framework could be used for
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other uses-cases. For example, we believe that the SDN-VSA framework can
be used in the detection of forwarding loops. A forward loop is created when
a packet (with an unchanged header) returns to a port it previously visited
[8]. Using SDN-VSA, a forwarding loop could be detected by analyzing the
composite transformation matrix. In particular, by scanning the flow tables
and looking for flow rules that have additive inverses (see §5.3).
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed SDN-VSA, a framework that uses affine trans-
formations and vector spaces to model SDN control applications. Then, we
presented a formulation for the framework that can be used in the anal-
ysis of SDN control applications. Finally, we showed a uses-case for the
SDN-VSA framework. In the future, we plan to explore more use-cases for
such framework. Nonetheless, we plan to explore other formulations for the
SDN-VSA framework using different vector spaces which can support more
complex OpenFlow functionalities as QoS.
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